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Economic Cyber Espionage 
CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER 
Cyber threats have emerged as one of the most serious dangers to U.S. 
and global security.  Increasingly, malicious actors—some private, but others 
that appear to be state-sponsored—seek to advance their strategic aims 
through violent or non-violent cyber-attacks.  This Article considers the 
problem of non-violent, yet still destructive, economic cyber espionage, which 
targets the intellectual, industrial, and information property of major global 
powers like the United States.  
The Article argues that the international community’s reticence is owing 
to a stale set of international legal norms.  The Article explains how existing 
principles of international law—such as state sovereignty, non-intervention, 
and state responsibility—should evolve to address the current threat of 
economic cyber espionage.  The Article also discusses how norms against 
economic cyber espionage could also be interpreted to exist within the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements that deal with intellectual property.  
These WTO rules together with the relevant (and modernized) customary 
norms arguably provide WTO member states recourse to the Dispute 
Settlement Body to assert their claims of economic cyber espionage.  The 
Article urges victim states to channel their legal complaints through this 
economic body and its dispute resolution mechanism.  It concludes with a 
realist perspective on why the WTO would be the most effective institution to 
ensure compliance with these norms.  
 
ARTICLE CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1167	  
II.  UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT:  WHY STATES  
ENGAGE IN  ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE .................................. 1172	  
A.  POWER TRANSITION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WORLD ORDER 1172	  
1.  The Factors that Influence China’s Rise ...................................... 1173	  
2.  China Depends on Integration  
Within the International Economic Order .................................. 1174	  
B.  CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY FOR RISING ............................................... 1176	  
1.  China’s Peaceful Rise ................................................................... 1176	  
2.  A Grand Strategy of Cyber Espionage ......................................... 1177	  
III.  CUSTOMARY NORMS AND ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE ....... 1179	  
A.  THE ESPIONAGE LACUNA IN THE LAW ................................................... 1179	  
1.  U.S. Domestic Law and Economic Cyber Espionage ................... 1179	  
2.  International Law and Espionage ................................................. 1181	  
B.  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS 
AGAINST ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE ............................................. 1184	  
1.  A “Constitutive Process” for Normative Evolution ..................... 1184	  
2.  Economic Sovereignty and the  
Right to Non-Economic Intervention ............................................ 1186	  
IV.  DEVELOPING STATE PRACTICE AGAINST  
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: ASSERTING CLAIMS IN THE WTO ....... 1194	  
A.  WTO LAW AND THE NORM OF ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY .................... 1194	  
1.  WTO Treaty-Based Protections of Intellectual Property ............. 1194	  
2.  Customary International Law and WTO Treaty-Based Rules ...... 1197	  
3.  The WTO Mechanisms for Enforcement ....................................... 1200	  
B.  THE WTO AS A CREDIBLE SOURCE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY .......... 1204	  
1.  The WTO Has Power and Authority that  
Aspiring Superpower States Will Respect .................................... 1205	  
2.  The WTO Presents a Palatable Solution ...................................... 1206	  
V.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 1207	  
 
 
  
An International Law Response to  
Economic Cyber Espionage  
CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Spying has re-emerged as a significant problem for national security.  
Today, in the Internet and information age, states have re-tooled their 
espionage techniques for use in cyberspace—and the United States is a 
prime target.1  For the past several years, cyber espionage has been 
adversely impacting the nation’s economic and national security.2  Covert 
cyberintrusions, which target U.S. industry, research, and technology, are 
undermining the economy and its global competitiveness.  But despite the 
damage that this spying has caused so far, these covert attacks continue, 
with no wholly effective legal or policy solution to date. 
Cyber espionage, and economic-oriented cyber espionage in particular, 
poses a serious threat to the United States’ national security.  This type of 
economic espionage “affects the sources of American power,”3 including 
its comparative advantage in scientific and technological innovation and 
development.  According to a report from the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive, cyberspace, “where most business activity 
and development of new ideas now takes place,” allows “malicious” 
cyberspies “to quickly steal and transfer massive quantities of data while 
                                                                                                                            
* J.D. Yale Law School, 2010; A.B. Princeton University, 2006.  Thank you to William Skinner, 
who helped me to develop this idea, and to Michael Reisman, BJ Ard, Pamela Foohey, Charlotte 
Garden, and Joshua Geltzer for their comments.  I am also grateful to the editors of the Connecticut 
Law Review for their careful editing of this Article. 
1 See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Mark Landler, U.S. and China Will Hold Talks About Hacking, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2013, at A1 (remarking that the growth of cyber-attacks is “a new enough 
phenomenon”).   
2 In the context of a case involving an illegal export of U.S. military software, one federal agent 
recently explained that “[w]hile the thefts associated with economic espionage and illegal technology 
transfers may not capture the same level of attention as a terrorist incident, the costs to the U.S. 
economy and our national security are substantial.”  Press Release: United Technologies Subsidiary 
Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges for Helping China Develop New 
Attack Helicopter, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 28, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ct/Press2012/201206
28.html. 
3 JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION IN 
CYBERSPACE 50 (2013), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/130208_Lewis_ConflictCyberspac
e_Web.pdf; see also id. (noting that “[t]rade is a national security issue”). 
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remaining anonymous and hard to detect.”4  The report also warned that 
“[c]yber tools have enhanced the economic espionage threat, and the 
Intelligence Community . . . judges the use of such tools is already a larger 
threat than more traditional espionage methods.”5  As commentators have 
noted, “[T]he hemorrhage of intellectual property (IP)—our most 
important international competitive advantage—is a national crisis.  Nearly 
every U.S. business sector—advanced materials, electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and biotech, chemicals, aerospace, heavy equipment, 
autos, home products, software and defense systems—has experienced 
massive theft and illegal reproduction.”6  It comes as no surprise, then, that 
the 2010 National Security Strategy assessed “[c]ybersecurity threats 
represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and 
economic challenges we face as a nation.”7 
Though there are no doubt other actors who have resorted to economic 
cyber espionage, Chinese actors appear to be at least one significant source 
of this activity.8  In the past few years, China has reportedly attacked many 
                                                                                                                            
4 OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. 
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION 
AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, 2009–2011, at i (2011) [hereinafter FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. 
ECONOMIC SECRETS]. 
5 Id.  
6 Dennis Blair & John Huntsman, Jr., Safeguard U.S. Ingenuity, WASH. POST, May 22, 2013, at 
A19.  Private industry and government are not the only sectors affected; academia has also been the 
victim of serious cyberintrusions.  According to the New York Times, “America’s research 
universities . . . are increasingly coming under cyberattack, most of it thought to be from China, with 
millions of hacking attempts weekly.  Campuses are being forced to tighten security, constrict their 
culture of openness and try to determine what has been stolen.”  Richard Pérez-Peña, Campuses Face 
Rising Threat from Hackers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, at A1.  The target, however, remains the same: 
intellectual property.  
Universities and their professors are awarded thousands of patents each year, some 
with vast potential value, in fields as disparate as prescription drugs, computer chips, 
fuel cells, aircraft and medical devices. . . . Like major corporations, universities 
develop intellectual property that can turn into valuable products like prescription 
drugs or computer chips.  But university systems are harder to secure, with 
thousands of students and staff members logging in with their own computers. 
Id. 
7 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 27 (2010), cited in THE TALLINN MANUAL 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 2 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) 
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. 
8 The evidence that China sponsors cyber espionage includes detailed reports by the cybersecurity 
firm Mandiant.  One report published in 2013 indicates that: 
APT1 [an advanced threat actor called “Advanced Persistent Threat”] has been 
stealing hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141 organizations across a 
diverse set of industries beginning as early as 2006. . . . Once the group establishes 
access to a victim’s network, they continue to access it periodically over several 
months or years to steal large volumes of valuable intellectual property, including 
technological blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business 
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sectors of the U.S. economy and agencies critical to our national security, 
penetrating the online systems of the U.S. Departments of Homeland 
Security and State, Coca-Cola, Lockheed Martin, Dow Chemical, Adobe, 
Yahoo!, and Google, to name just a few.9  According to General Keith B. 
Alexander, head of the United States Cyber Command and director of the 
National Security Agency, these cyber “attacks have resulted in the 
‘greatest transfer of wealth in history.’”10  
The U.S. government has officially accused China of e-spying on 
American interests.11  A Pentagon report released in May 2013 found that 
China’s cyber espionage targeted industrial technology, as well as 
government policy information.12  In February 2014, the New York Times 
reported, “Obama administration officials say they are planning to tell 
China’s new leaders . . . that the volume and sophistication of the attacks 
have become so intense that they threaten the fundamental relationship 
between Washington and Beijing.”13  And on May 19, 2014, the U.S. 
Department of Justice announced that it was indicting five members of the 
                                                                                                                            
plans, pricing documents, partnership agreements, emails and contact lists from 
victim organizations’ leadership.  
MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 20 (2013) [hereinafter 
MANDIANT REPORT], available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.  It 
concludes “that APT1 is likely government sponsored.”  Id. at 2.  More recently, Mandiant has inferred 
from the intelligence it has collected that “A.P.T. 1 is Unit 61398” of the Chinese Army, “the central 
element of Chinese computer espionage.”  David E. Sanger et al., China’s Army Seen as Tied to 
Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, at A1.  It is from the location of this Unit that “an 
overwhelming percentage of the attacks on American corporations, organizations and government 
agencies” is believed to originate.  Id.  There are many other published accounts of China’s 
participation in cyber espionage.  See, e.g., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS, supra 
note 4, at i (“Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic 
espionage.”); Michael Riley, Snowden’s Leaks Cloud U.S. Plan to Curb Chinese Hacking, 
BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-01/snowden-s-leaks-cloud-u-
s-plan-to-curb-chinese-hacking.html (“The U.S. already has privately provided China’s leaders with 
evidence it gathered linking the hacks of commercial companies to China’s intelligence 
agencies . . . .”); sources cited infra notes 9–12.  However, this Article does not assume that China is 
the only country capable of or culpable for committing economic cyber espionage.  Other countries 
reportedly engage in cyber espionage as well.  See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 3, at 44–45 (describing 
Russia’s cyber espionage efforts and noting that Israel and France have also been accused of 
maintaining state-led cyber espionage programs). 
9 Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple. China. Cyberwar., CNNMONEY (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/03/31/apple-china-hackers-tradewar. 
10 Sanger & Landler, supra note 1.   
11 David E. Sanger, China’s Military Is Accused by U.S. in Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 
2013, at A1. 
12 Id.  Although this Article is principally concerned with private sector thefts, according to the 
Pentagon report, “China is using its computer network exploitation capability to support intelligence 
collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. 
national defense programs.”  Gopal Ratnam, Pentagon Accuses China of Cyberspying on U.S. 
Government, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-06/china-s-
military-ambitions-growing-pentagon-report-finds.html. 
13 Sanger et al., supra note 8.  
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People’s Liberation Army of China for the alleged economic cyber 
espionage activities of Unit 61398.14  Surely, the United States has by now 
recognized that some meaningful action should be taken to address this 
problem.15  For many years, however, these “[Chinese] intrusions . . . 
provoked little American response.”16  But economic cyber espionage is no 
longer on the back burner.  While administration officials once felt that 
“the theft of intellectual property was an annoyance, resulting in the loss of 
billions of dollars of revenue,” their recent actions indicate “something has 
changed.”17   
Yet economic cyber espionage is not only a domestic concern.  Just as 
it harms the United States’ economy, economic cyber espionage also 
threatens international trade and, over time, stands to have a destabilizing 
impact on the global economic order.  For this reason, as a top Obama 
Administration official has stated, “the international community cannot 
tolerate such activity from any country.”18  The international community 
has not, however, formulated a coherent response.  Although various 
factors could be blamed for this tepid response, the lack of clearly 
established law regarding economic cyber espionage or institutionalized 
mechanisms for regulating this activity very likely impedes further 
                                                                                                                            
14 David E. Sanger, With Spy Charges, U.S. Draws a Line that Few Others Recognize, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A8. 
15 Others have recognized the need for firm policy action: “[T]he federal government must 
establish policies that firmly signal a commitment to protect American businesses and warn hostile 
actors that they cannot inflict critical damage on the U.S. economy without consequence.”  Evan F. 
Kohlmann & Rodrigo Bijou, Planning Responses and Defining Attacks in Cyberspace, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 173, 174 (2013).  As U.S. Representative Mike Rogers underscored to the House Committee on 
Intelligence: 
China’s economic espionage has reached an intolerable level and I believe that the 
United States and our allies in Europe and Asia have an obligation to confront 
Beijing and demand that they put a stop to this piracy.   
Beijing is waging a massive trade war on us all, and we should band together to 
pressure them to stop.  Combined, the United States and our allies in Europe and 
Asia have significant diplomatic and economic leverage over China, and we should 
use this to our advantage to put an end to this scourge. 
MANDIANT REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 (quoting Cyber Threats and Ongoing Efforts to Protect the 
Nation: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Rep. Mike Rogers, Chairman, H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence)). 
16 David Feith, The Weekend Interview with Timothy L. Thomas: Why China Is Reading Your 
Email, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2013, at A11. 
17 Sanger et al., supra note 8.  This New York Times article also notes the “mounting evidence of 
state sponsorship” and the fact that “[t]he United States government is planning to begin a more 
aggressive defense against Chinese hacking groups.”  Id.  Until now, it seemed as though most 
attention had been focused on the threat of a large-scale kinetic cyberattack.  In actuality, others have 
argued that “[t]he most severe threats lie in attacks against critical infrastructure” and the theft of 
valuable economic and strategic intellectual property or systems.  Kohlmann & Bijou, supra note 15, at 
173. 
18 Feith, supra note 16.  
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action.19  This anormativity and lack of institutional arrangements for 
enforcing norms on the international level has created a moral hazard and 
legal vacuum.  In this landscape, economic cyber espionage is arguably 
perceived by some states, like China and others that are similarly 
motivated, as a rational strategy for advancing an upward economic 
trajectory.    
This Article urges the international community to respond to the 
normative and institutional gap in the law in order to treat the problem of 
economic cyber espionage.  In so doing, the Article explains how certain 
norms of public international law can be said to apply to cyber espionage 
and should be incorporated into the existing treaty-based framework of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  The Article also explains why pressing 
claims in the WTO would be effective against perpetrators of economic 
cyber espionage.  Namely, this approach would both solidify customary 
norms against economic cyber espionage and leverage a credible source of 
authority to curb cyber-violations.  To advance this thesis, the Article 
proceeds in three Parts. 
Part II considers the problem of economic cyber espionage through the 
lens of China’s conduct, using the country as a case study.  It explores the 
connection between China’s rise to superpower status and its acts of cyber 
espionage in the United States.  Specifically, Part II discusses China’s 
pressure to expand economically and its dependence on continued 
integration within the world economic order, including through 
membership in key multilateral economic institutions like the WTO.  
Part II suggests that states with these types of strategic motives may be 
more prone to succumb to the moral and institutional ambiguity 
surrounding economic cyber espionage. 
Part III addresses the anormativity surrounding economic cyber 
espionage.  It argues that economic cyber espionage violates well-
established norms of customary international law, such as sovereignty, 
non-intervention, and state responsibility.  It discusses how the existing 
principle of state sovereignty also provides a derivative right to economic 
sovereignty, which is directly violated by economic cyber espionage.  
Moreover, to the extent states sponsor the economic cyber-intervention of 
non-state actors—i.e., cyberspies—those states can be held accountable 
under the doctrines of state responsibility or non-intervention.  In short, 
Part III argues that economic cyber espionage is illegal under customary 
principles of international law, even if traditional espionage is not.  
                                                                                                                            
19 See Kohlmann & Bijou, supra note 15, at 173 (“A lack of established international legal 
procedures, a hazy public understanding of the mechanics of electronic intrusions, and cyberterrorists’ 
exponentially faster operational tempo (all combined with the extreme challenges involved in 
definitively identifying perpetrators on the Internet) have allowed some lawless actors to operate with a 
surprising sense of impunity.”). 
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Part IV suggests an institutional mechanism for enforcing these rights 
through the WTO.  It first points out that the customary norm of economic 
sovereignty, as an aspect of the lex generalis, applies in conjunction with 
existing treaty-based rights under the WTO agreements, which is a lex 
specialis.  By interpreting the WTO treaty rules in the context of the lex 
generalis of economic sovereignty and non-economic intervention, 
member states may arguably assert a claim under the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) against any member state that engages 
in or sponsors economic cyber espionage.  On that basis, Part IV urges the 
United States to assert a claim in the WTO against member states that 
violate its economic sovereignty through economic cyber espionage.  In 
the specific case of China, Part IV argues that the WTO—as the anchor of 
the international economic order and thus a necessary role-player in 
China’s plan to obtain superpower status—has the ability to ensure 
Chinese compliance.  And given the procedures of the WTO dispute 
resolution mechanism, China would be likely to engage cooperatively with 
the process, avoiding unnecessary confrontation between the United States 
and China or a deterioration in U.S.-Sino relations.  
II.  UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT:  WHY STATES ENGAGE IN  
ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE  
This Article begins by considering, from a political and international 
relations perspective,20 the possible strategic motivations that drive states 
to engage in economic cyber espionage.  In deconstructing the particular 
case of China, Part II suggests that economic cyber espionage may be 
state-driven and not purely private conduct, bringing it within the bounds 
of public international law.  Moreover, it demonstrates that the motivation 
to engage in economic cyber espionage is two-fold: to achieve economic 
expansion and avoid global alienation.  In this circumstance, the rules of 
law and dispute settlement mechanisms of a multilateral economic 
institution, like the WTO, would be effective in persuading such a state to 
abandon this activity.  Part II concludes that other states with similar 
motives are also likely to take advantage of the normative and institutional 
vacuum that exists in the international law on economic cyber espionage. 
A.  Power Transition in the Twenty-First Century World Order 
International relations scholars have studied the impact of states’ 
efforts to advance their status in the global order.  Power transition theory 
presents one particular approach to analyzing shifts in the global order that 
                                                                                                                            
20 As President Barack Obama has noted, in many ways, the “old architecture” of international 
law is “buckling under the weight of new threats.”  Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 
Oslo, Norway, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 985, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2009).  
 2014] AN INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE 1173 
accompany transitions of power between states.21  According to the basic 
tenets of the theory, which was first developed by A.F.K. Organzski and 
later refined by Robert Gilpin, war is the likely consequence of power 
transitions in which the challenging state is both dissatisfied with its 
position and has or is near to parity with the dominant state.22  War, 
however, is not an inevitable outcome of a power transition.23  In fact, the 
post-World War II global order, largely built on multilateral institution and 
alliance, is conducive to peaceful power transitions, including China’s rise 
to superpower status.  By design, states transitioning to power in the 
contemporary world order require the support of these various legal 
institutions.  In theory, then, would-be superpowers should want to be 
careful to avoid a disruption in their relationships with these institutions.  
1.  The Factors that Influence China’s Rise 
China faces intense pressure to expand economically.  Theories that 
explain why states seek to expand territorially provide some insight into 
why aspiring superpower states, like China, seek to expand in the 
economic space.24  For instance, according to the theory of “lateral 
pressure,” developed by Nazli Choueri and Robert North, “States 
experiencing high rates of population growth and technological change 
require increasing stocks of resources to fuel further economic 
development.  Over time, states find that they lack resources within their 
boundaries and thus face mounting ‘lateral pressure’ to expand abroad.”25  
Although this theory has been applied in the context of physical 
resources,26 economic expansion today also requires technology and 
intellectual property.27  Consistent with this theory, as China’s growth 
outstrips its technological resources, it may seek out these resources 
abroad.28 
                                                                                                                            
21 Jack S. Levy, Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China, in CHINA’S ASCENT: POWER 
SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 11, 12 (Robert S. Ross & Zhu Feng eds., 
2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S ASCENT]. 
22 Id. at 12–14. 
23 See M. Taylor Fravel, International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s 
Potential for Territorial Expansion, 12 INT’L STUDS. REV. 505, 506 (2010) (“[S]cholars . . . note that 
some transitions have been peaceful, such as the one between the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the late nineteenth century.”). 
24 See id. at 513 (“China today appears to fit the criteria of an ‘alpha’ state prone to lateral 
pressure . . . . As China’s economy has developed rapidly over the past two decades . . . its need for 
resources has grown dramatically.”).  
25 Id. 
26 See id. (discussing China’s need for various “products and commodities . . . such as petroleum 
or arable land”). 
27 See Sanger & Landler, supra note 1 (“Chinese academics and industrialists say that if China is 
to maintain its annual economic growth . . . it needs a steady inflow of new technology.”). 
28 See Fravel, supra note 23, at 513 (explaining that, under the theory of lateral pressure, states 
often “believe that . . . [resources] need to be captured or controlled through conquest”). 
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China also faces internal pressure to expand economically.  Its desire 
to be a “rich and strong country” is centuries old,29 but has intensified 
during the last few decades.30  Chinese leaders apparently maintain that the 
time is ripe for China to advance technologically and grow its economy.31  
These messages have cultivated an economically-oriented national 
mentality.32 
A national expectation of growth and technological advancement has a 
powerful effect on Chinese foreign policy and strategy.  International 
relations theory recognizes that “collective ideas . . . ‘matter’ in [shaping] 
foreign policy.”33  As one scholar explained, Chinese foreign policy is, in 
part, a function of the “expectations it generates in the domestic arena and 
the results that are experienced.”34  Thus, meeting the economic 
expectations they have created is a priority for Chinese leaders.35  As such, 
China’s aim to rise within the global order is arguably a means to an end of 
national economic development. 
2.  China Depends on Integration Within the International Economic 
Order 
China’s ability to expand economically depends on its integration 
within the world economic order.36  As one China specialist has explained: 
China has benefitted tremendously from its participation in 
the existing international economic order.  Indeed, China has 
risen precisely by deepening its engagement with existing 
institutions, not challenging them.  To date, China’s 
economic development has occurred through the relative 
openness of its economy to trade and foreign investment.  In 
return, China has become increasingly dependent on such 
                                                                                                                            
29 Jeffrey W. Legro, What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power, 5 PERSP. 
ON POL. 515, 517 (2007); see also Fravel, supra note 23, at 518–23 (discussing domestic pressures for 
expansion, which include nationalism). 
30 In 1997, Jiang Zemin reportedly reminded China that it “seeks ‘the goal of being prosperous 
and strong’—an aim shared by Chinese leaders . . . throughout the ages.”  Legro, supra note 29, at 517 
(quoting Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, FED’N 
AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014)). 
31 FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS, supra note 4, at 5. 
32 See Legro, supra note 29, at 525 (noting that China’s leaders justify integration into the 
international order based on “economic development” and “bettering the living standards of Chinese 
citizens”). 
33 Id. at 522.  
34 Id. at 524.  
35 See id. at 525 (“[T]he legitimacy and popular support of the government does not rest on 
socialist ideology, but instead on economic performance.  ‘Well-off Society’ not ‘Workers Unite’ is the 
national mantra.”).  
36 See id. (“The first, and most important, justification of [China’s] current policy is that 
integration within the existing national order provides the best means for national economic 
development.”). 
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openness for high rates of economic growth.37 
China has thus sought to avoid instigating the creation of anti-China 
coalitions, which could threaten its “continued economic development” 
and ostracize it from the global economic community.38  
For these reasons, China’s relationship with the United States is 
strategically delicate.  Although the world is becoming increasingly 
multipolar, the United States may still occupy the role of hegemon.39  This 
power dynamic has made it difficult for China to balance the United 
States,40 and China has chosen instead to “bandwagon” or cooperate with 
the United States.41  Although internally China may desire to resist 
perceived U.S. dominance,42 an outwardly aggressive policy would 
disserve its ultimate aim, as the United States has been a proponent of 
China’s assimilation into the economic order that has supported its rise.43  
As the next Section argues, if China feels pressure to appear peaceful while 
at the same time amassing the resources it needs to propel itself toward 
superpower status,44 economic cyber espionage may seem like the ideal 
strategy. 
                                                                                                                            
37 Fravel, supra note 23, at 511 (citation omitted).  
38 Id. at 510.  
39 See Matthew Happold, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 1, 2 
(Matthew Happold ed., 2012) (“[T]he international system appears to be experiencing a tendency 
toward multipolarity . . . .”); Zhu Feng, China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful, in CHINA’S ASCENT, supra note 
21, at 34, 36–37 (discussing U.S. hegemony dynamics in the face of a “rising China”). 
40 Id. at 37.  Just as China cannot internally balance U.S. power, it cannot persuade any partners to 
try to do so with it.  See id. at 42–43 (noting that an attempt to balance would be “ineffective” and as a 
result there is “little incentive . . . to attempt to weaken U.S. power” through external measures and 
coalitions like “reordering either the global or regional alignments”).   
41 Id. at 43, 44. 
42 Id. at 39.  Resistance to U.S. power has become a matter of national pride as “Chinese blogs are 
full of national rhetoric accusing the United States of seeking to keep China bowed and humbled.”  
Zachary Karabell, Do American Politicians Even Care About the Rise of China Anymore?, ATLANTIC, 
(June 7, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/do-american-politicians-even-care-
about-the-rise-of-china-anymore/276663.   
43 See Tom Johnson, Clinton Pushes Open Trade, CNNMONEY (Jan. 29, 2000), 
http://money.cnn.com/2000/01/29/economy/davos_clinton/ (describing how President Clinton 
supported China’s entry to the WTO); Phillip C. Saunders, The U.S. Isn’t Trying to Contain China, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 23, 2013), www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/23/the_united_states_is_not
_trying_to_contain_china (arguing that the U.S. is “working to expand China’s role in international 
organizations and increase U.S. access to China’s market,” rather than trying to contain China, and 
noting that trade between the United States and China increased during the first half of 2013 and 
reached $244 billion).  As Ashley Tellis argues, from the U.S. perspective, a policy of economic 
containment could not be successful now in light of China’s integration in the world economic order.  
ASHLEY J. TELLIS, BALANCING WITHOUT CONTAINMENT: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR MANAGING 
CHINA 8–9 (2014); see id. at 19 (noting that “the American polity has not yet responded to the growth 
of Chinese power with the seriousness and urgency that it displayed . . . in regard to the Soviet threat”).  
44 See Fravel, supra note 23, at 511 (“In the early 2000s, Chinese political elites began to frame 
China’s foreign policy around the concept of ‘peaceful rise.’”). 
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B.  China’s Grand Strategy for Rising  
These strategic considerations may explain why a state like China is 
not necessarily interested in expanding its power by physical force or other 
overtly antagonistic strategies.45  As Gao Cheng argues, for some rising 
powers there appears to be a “deeper economic logic” behind the drive to 
expand.46  This Section considers why economic espionage may appear to 
be a logical or rational strategy to Chinese decision-makers. 
1.  China’s Peaceful Rise 
An economic expansionist rising in the twenty-first century, such as 
China, is unlikely to aggress against the international economic 
community.47  In China’s case, its leaders no doubt recognize that a 
“confrontational and aggressive foreign policy” would harm China’s 
economic development.48  Aggressive foreign policies would “damage . . . 
decades of economic reforms in terms of lost trade, foreign investment, 
and technology, and, more generally, its participation in an international 
order that has facilitated greatly its rise.”49  China is therefore expected to 
pursue a strategy of “reassurance” vis-à-vis the international community.50 
Likely for these reasons, in the early twenty-first century Chinese 
political elites began to characterize China’s foreign policy “around the 
concept of ‘peaceful rise.’”51  The image of the peaceful riser was 
“strategic, designed to convey a benign and non-threatening image to other 
states, reassuring them about China’s growing capabilities.”52  And China 
has taken various steps to solidify its image as a peaceful riser.  For 
example, it has abided by Confucian values, endeavored to “conjure up a 
collective historical memory across East Asia,” and spread Chinese 
                                                                                                                            
45 See Gao Cheng, Market Expansion and Grand Strategy of Rising Powers, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L 
POL. 405, 412 (2011) (explaining that “the specific means through which [rising powers] choose to 
expand . . . depend primarily on a cost-benefit analysis” and that “using force to change the status quo 
is not necessarily the path that a rising power will follow”).  
46 Id. at 411.  Cheng argues, “[A]s a state rises in the industrial era . . . the basic goal of its grand 
strategy is to achieve economic development.”  Id.  Cheng departs from traditional power transition 
theory (among others) and asserts that such arguments “fail to consider the strategy guiding China’s 
rise as a choice based on industrial needs.”  Id. at 444.  He contends that “[t]he strategies great powers 
follow in rising accord with an economic principle.”  Id. 
47 See Feng, supra note 39, at 36 (“Many scholars stress that China’s extensive participation in 
globalization and normative economic diplomacy may mitigate its revisionist objectives and may 
socialize it into the existing order.”); see also Fravel, supra note 23, at 506 (suggesting the utility of 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether China’s rise will be aggressive).  
48 Fravel, supra note 23, at 511.  
49 Id. at 506.  
50 See id. at 510 (arguing that China will pursue a grand strategy of “reassurance, which is keyed 
to participation in the existing international order and preventing the formation of a counter-balancing 
coalition that could block or limit China’s continued economic development”).  
51 Id. at 511.  
52 Id.  
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academic thinking on a more global scale.53 
Yet China, which has been growing at a rapid pace in the past several 
decades,54 naturally requires resources to sustain that growth.  The inputs 
needed to fuel an expanding economy today are not only physical but also, 
importantly, technological and innovative.55  Like other great powers 
before it, China is likely focused on “obtaining the necessary factors of 
production, resources, and markets” to propel its rise to superpower 
status.56 
These economic pressures and constraints leave a state such as China 
in a difficult strategic situation.  On the one hand, it must avoid outward 
displays of antagonism toward the international economic order.  On the 
other, to maintain its progression to superpower status, it must continue to 
push its economy to the next level, feeding this expansion with what it 
perceives to be the necessary technological and scientific resource inputs.  
2.  A Grand Strategy of Cyber Espionage  
A grand strategy of economic cyber espionage could, in theory, serve 
China’s aim of maintaining a peaceful image while expanding 
economically at a rapid pace—particularly when targeted against the 
United States or another superpower that has made significant 
technological and innovative advancements.57  The U.S. private sector, as a 
leader in technological development and a “central player in global 
financial and trade networks,” is an especially attractive target for 
economic cyber espionage by a state that is eager to make rapid gains in its 
own technological and economic fields.58  For an aspiring economic 
superpower, it may well seem that “economic espionage [is] an essential 
tool in achieving national security and economic prosperity,” and China 
may continue to be one of the most “aggressive and capable collectors of 
sensitive US economic information and technologies . . . in cyberspace.”59 
                                                                                                                            
53 Gordon C.K. Cheung, International Relations Theory in Flux in View of China’s “Peaceful 
Rise,” 26 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUDS. 5, 12–13 (2008); see id. at 12–17 (describing China’s use of 
soft power). 
54 See ZULIU HU & MOHSIN S. KHAN, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ECONOMIC ISSUES 
REPORT 8: WHY IS CHINA GROWING SO FAST? 1 (1997) (noting that since 1978 China has grown at 
more than nine percent per annum, with an almost four hundred percent rise in per capita income). 
55 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text; see also Levy, supra note 21, at 18–19 
(suggesting that some predictions made under power transition theory may not sufficiently or precisely 
account for the impact of innovation). 
56 Cheng, supra note 45, at 412. 
57 See Sanger & Landler, supra note 1 (“Chinese academics and industrialists say that if China is 
to maintain its annual economic growth rate of 7 or 8 percent, it needs a steady inflow of new 
technology.  That could make the Chinese reluctant to cut back on the systematic theft of intellectual 
property.”). 
58 FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS, supra note 4, at i. 
59 Id. at ii, 4.  
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Cyber espionage also has the advantage of offering plausible 
deniability.  To be sure, China has rigorously denied accusations of 
economic cyber espionage, calling it “unprofessional and groundless to 
accuse the Chinese military of launching cyberattacks without any 
conclusive evidence.”60  China’s Defense Ministry maintains that “[t]he 
Chinese military has never supported any hack attacks” and suggests that 
the cyberattacks have been perpetrated by transnational actors with 
“anonymous characteristics.”61  On balance, a program of economic cyber 
espionage may seem, from the perspective of a state like China, to have 
several benefits and few drawbacks.  Cyber espionage fuels technological 
growth while, at the same time, “soft balancing” the United States.62  
Moreover, due to its covert nature, China may preserve its image as a 
peaceful riser and represent to the United States that it is not responsible 
for these intrusions.  And ultimately there is, as of yet, no tangible legal 
repercussion.  
Yet a firmer response from the international community, grounded in 
principles of international law, may alter this perspective and reduce the 
appeal of economic cyber espionage.63  As the next two Parts will show, a 
legal response is not only appropriate and potentially effective, but it also 
sends a broader message that is conducive to global stability: in the twenty-
first century, superpowers may rise in the global order provided they do so 
within the rule of law.  To that end, Part III argues that certain norms of 
public international law already provide a basis for asserting this conduct 
as unlawful. 
                                                                                                                            
60 Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Suspected in Attack on Post’s Computers, WASH. 
POST., Feb. 2, 2013, at A1; see also Sanger, supra note 11 (quoting Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as saying “China . . . resolutely oppose[s] all forms of hacker 
attacks”).  
61 Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 60.  The Chinese have continued to deny these allegations 
in the face of a U.S. criminal indictment charging economic cyber espionage and theft of trade secrets.  
E.g., Timothy M. Phelps & Julie Makinen, U.S.-China Cyber Battle Grows; Five Chinese Military 
Officials Are Accused of Stealing U.S. Corporate Secrets. Beijing Calls Charges “Fabricated.”, L.A. 
TIMES, May 19, 2014, at A1.   
62 See Feng, supra note 39, at 50 (describing soft balancing as engaging in “measures [that] do not 
directly challenge a unipolar state’s military preponderance, but rather seek to delay, complicate, or 
increase the costs of that state’s exercise of its power”). 
63 Others believe that the rules of law on warfare justify a counter-attack in certain cyber-attack 
situations.  See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyberspace and International Law: The Penumbral Mist of 
Uncertainty, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 176, 177 (2013) (“At a certain level of severity, cyberoperations 
cross the ‘armed attack’ threshold, thereby allowing states to defend themselves with force, including 
cyberforce, pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law.  The concept of 
armed attacks at least includes cyberoperations causing death, injury, or significant damage.”); see also 
Jan E. Messerschmidt, Note, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State Actors as 
Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 279 
(2013) (“[S]tates have an obligation of due diligence to prevent significant transboundary cyberharm to 
another state’s intellectual property. . . . [A]ffected states may be entitled to reciprocate by . . . allowing 
their victimized nationals to hackback.” (emphasis added)).  
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III.  CUSTOMARY NORMS AND ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE  
This Part argues that the international community should recognize 
economic cyber espionage as prohibited under established principles of 
customary international law.  Section A first explains why economic cyber 
espionage may seem to fall within a gap in the law.  Though prosecutable 
as a domestic crime, China’s state-sponsored cyberactions may be 
effectively outside the United States’ reach, even if personal jurisdiction 
could be said to apply.64  More importantly, this conduct seems 
untouchable by international law.  Historically, espionage has existed in 
the hinterlands—neither expressly condoned nor condemned.  Yet with the 
capacity to cripple states’ economies and de-stabilize the global economic 
order at a rapid and uncontrollable pace, economic cyber espionage should 
be treated differently. 
Section B next argues in favor of a modernized interpretation of 
existing principles of international law.  Specifically, it considers how 
existing norms—first recognized decades ago—should be interpreted today 
to fit the contemporary threat of economic cyber espionage.  Although 
existing norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention have customarily 
been applied to safeguard the territorial integrity of states, today serious 
threats to security are mounted from cyberspace.  These invasions are 
aimed to alter states’ economic powers and relationships, not their borders.  
Accordingly, Section B argues that the principles of state sovereignty and 
non-intervention, which provide derivative rights to economic sovereignty 
and non-economic intervention, also prohibit economic cyber espionage.  
By extension, states may be held accountable for violating these principles 
either directly or through their sponsorship of these cyber actions.  
A.  The Espionage Lacuna in the Law  
This Section explains the various bodies of domestic and international 
law that could regulate economic cyber espionage but, for various reasons, 
cannot effectively do so or simply do not yet recognize this conduct as 
illegal.  The result is a perceived lacuna in the law surrounding economic 
cyber espionage.  Subsection 1 discusses this lacuna and Subsection 2 
explains why it is an illusion and why existing international law norms 
could, in fact, fill this space. 
1.  U.S. Domestic Law and Economic Cyber Espionage 
The covert theft of U.S. intellectual property and industrial secrets is 
well covered by domestic criminal law.  For one, the Economic Espionage 
                                                                                                                            
64 For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of the criminal law, see Sara A. Solow, 
Prosecuting Terrorists as Criminals and the Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1483, 1508–16 (2011). 
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Act of 1996 directly criminalizes this behavior.65  The statute provides that 
economic espionage occurs when an actor knowingly or intentionally 
commits an offense that “will benefit any foreign government, foreign 
instrumentality, or foreign agent,” and “knowingly”: (1) steals or obtains a 
trade secret by “fraud, artifice, or deception” or by other unauthorized 
means; (2) “conveys a trade secret” by various methods of copying 
(without authorization); or (3) “receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret 
knowing” it was stolen or otherwise taken without authorization.66  Given 
the breadth of this statute, it is surely intended to capture economic 
espionage that is perpetrated in cyberspace and with cybertools.67  In fact, 
the United States has recently used this statute to charge five Chinese 
military hackers for acts of economic cyber espionage, among other 
crimes, against U.S. companies.68  
In reality, however, a U.S. prosecution for economic cyber espionage 
likely does not loom large for foreign actors such as these.69  It has been 
noted that “[e]spionage is nothing but the violation of someone else’s 
laws.”70  Thus, for U.S. law to serve as a meaningful deterrent to foreign 
actors, the United States must be able to apprehend and punish these actors 
within the four corners of its domestic law.  Yet, as a practical matter, 
cyberspies can indefinitely evade prosecution if their host state refuses to 
cooperate.  In the case of China, for example, under the terms of the U.S.-
Hong Kong Extradition Treaty, China can refuse to extradite a person 
within its borders if “surrender implicates the ‘defense, foreign affairs or 
essential public interest or policy’ of the People’s Republic of China.”71  
Thus the efficacy of the United States’ criminal action will depend on 
                                                                                                                            
65 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012). 
66 Id. § 1831.  
67 Of the seven cases brought under the Economic Espionage Act in 2010, six related to China.  
COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 42 (2013). 
68 Indictment, United States v. Wang Dong, No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf. 
69 See COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., supra note 67, at 41 (observing that 
it is “notoriously difficult” to curb trade-secret theft and economic espionage under the current U.S. 
legal framework—with the latter offense being particularly problematic to prove because it “requires 
that the act be done with intent to benefit a foreign nation”); id. at 42 (noting that the extraterritorial 
reach of the Economic Espionage Act “remains limited”).  For an account of how narrow judicial 
readings have constrained the Economic Espionage Act’s efficacy, see generally Robin L. Kuntz, How 
Not to Catch a Thief: Why the Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 901 (2013). 
70 Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and International 
Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1077 (2006) (quoting U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks 
and Control of Foreign Intelligence: Hearings Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 
Part 5, 94th Cong. 1767 (1975) (statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to CIA Director)).  
71 Treaty Gives Hong Kong Option to Reject Snowden Extradition to the U.S., S. CHINA MORNING 
POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1257639/treaty-gives-hong-kong-
option-reject-snowden-extradition-us.  For the text of the treaty, see Agreement for the Surrender of 
Fugitive Offenders, U.S.–H.K., Dec. 20, 1996, T.I.A.S. No. 98-121. 
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China’s cooperation and the “hope[] that Beijing will ‘respect our criminal 
justice system and let justice take its course.’”72  But given Chinese 
officials’ denials of economic cyber espionage activities,73 it seems 
unlikely that its government will submit the accused to U.S. courts. 
U.S. law also addresses the problem of economic cyber espionage 
indirectly through the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.74  It gives the 
Executive the “authority to control the export of defense articles and 
services.”75  However, as a practical matter, the Arms Export Control Act 
is similarly limited in its application to the problem of economic cyber 
espionage.  On its face, it reaches bad actors within the United States who 
export prohibited items abroad.76  Thus while the U.S. may be effective at 
prosecuting the U.S.-based conduits of technology and trade secrets, 
hackers and spies operating abroad may continue to act with legal impunity 
for jurisdictional reasons.  
In sum, these domestic prohibitions—though forceful to the extent 
they apply—provide little deterrent to the continued perpetration of 
economic cyber espionage from outside actors.  Criminal charges may 
ultimately be more symbolic than punitive.  Another strategy, which works 
outside the U.S. criminal justice system and more directly implicates the 
cyber-hacking country’s standing and success in the international 
economic arena, is needed to effectively curtail this conduct.  
Moreover, the problem of economic cyber espionage is not one for the 
United States to solve alone.  Economic cyber espionage is a threat that is 
international in nature, as it has the potential to upset the global economic 
order by destabilizing trade and distorting competition.  As a threat to 
international security that is shared collectively by all members of the 
international community, this is a problem that international law can and 
should address.  
2.  International Law and Espionage 
Currently, however, international law seems to tolerate espionage and, 
                                                                                                                            
72 Ellen Nakashima & William Wan, Chinese Military Unit Charged with Cyber-Espionage 
Against U.S. Firms, WASH. POST (May 19, 2014),               
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-announce-first-criminal-charges-
against-foreign-country-for-cyberspying/2014/05/19/586c9992-df45-11e3-810f-
764fe508b82d_story.html. 
73 See China Denounces US Cyber-Theft Charges, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-27477601. 
74 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2799aa-2 (2012).  
75 The Arms Export Control Act, U.S. DEP’T ST., DIRECTORATE DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, 
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/aeca.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
76 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (explaining that the Act applies to “persons of the United States involved 
in the export and import of such articles and services”). 
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by extension, economic cyber espionage.77  While some bodies of 
international law might be relevant to spying, none adequately address this 
particular threat.78  Indeed, there is no clear consensus among states on the 
legal nature of espionage or whether states enjoy a right at international 
law to complain of it.79  Oddly, espionage remains “ill-defined under 
international law, even though all developed nations, as well as many 
lesser-developed ones, conduct spying and eavesdropping operations 
against their neighbors.”80  Although no international agreement expressly 
condones espionage, “states do not reject it as a violation of international 
law.”81  This historical acceptance has given espionage the appearance of 
lawful activity, “grounded in the [states’] recognition that ‘custom’ serves 
as an authoritative source of international law.”82  To the extent states are 
concerned with espionage at all, it is espionage at wartime that vexes them 
most.83  Meanwhile, international espionage at peacetime is virtually 
ignored.84  The academic literature has been equally silent.85  Indeed, 
“[l]eading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a perfunctory 
paragraph that defines a spy and describes his hapless fate in the event of 
capture.”86  Thus there appears to be a lacuna in the international law on 
espionage. 
States may perceive that economic cyber espionage exists in the same 
grey area as peacetime espionage, which is considered “an unfriendly act” 
                                                                                                                            
77 See David P. Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law: Controversies 
Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets Through Cyber Technologies, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS, 
no. 10, 2013, at 1, 2, available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight130320.pdf (noting that 
“[t]he desire to combat economic cyber espionage confronts a lack of international law on espionage 
and economic espionage” and the general “participation in, and tolerance of, spying”).   
78 See id. (“[R]ules on armed conflict and on diplomatic relations in peacetime[] do not prohibit or 
seriously constrain . . . economic espionage.”). 
79 See A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 595, 602 (2007) (using a three way split in existing literature as support for a “thesis that 
espionage is beyond international consensus”). 
80 Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2004). 
81 Id. at 1094.  
82 Id.  
83 See Chesterman, supra note 70, at 1078 (noting that spies caught during wartime have 
historically been subject to severe treatment, “reflect[ing] the danger posed by espionage and the 
difficulty of guarding against it”).  That said, according to Grotius, sending spies in war is “beyond 
doubt permitted by the law of nations.”  Id. (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI 
TRES 655 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
84 See Radsan, supra note 79, at 603 (“[A]ttention in the law to peacetime espionage has lagged 
behind the development of other international norms concerning intelligence gathering.” (quoting 
Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
85 Id. at 602 (quoting Richard A. Falk, Foreword to ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, at v (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962)). 
86 Id. (quoting Falk, supra note 85, at v) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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but not a violation of international law.87  Even if they do not view 
peacetime espionage as legal, per se, states may nonetheless tolerate this 
form of espionage because they perceive it to be in their self-interest.88  By 
this account, countries are likely “realistic” about the fact that they will 
commit espionage in other countries and want to safeguard their own 
option for continuing this practice.89  In any state’s estimation, endorsing 
norms against the practice of peacetime espionage would hinder its 
security as much as—if not more than—it enhances it.  As one scholar has 
argued, in this way states “preserve[] the practice [of espionage] as a tool 
by which to facilitate international cooperation.”90  On this view, the 
“rules” of espionage are not prescribed by law, but rather “are 
situational.”91  
However, it would be a mistake to afford the same legal treatment to 
economic cyber espionage.92  For one, unlike traditional espionage, 
economic cyber espionage takes place on a much larger scale.  The volume 
of information stolen via cyberspace, using cybertools, is much more 
significant and happens at a quicker pace than traditional human or 
technical intelligence gathering.93  Moreover, the penetration of computer 
systems and databases is far more difficult to detect and stop than 
traditional human espionage.94  Finally, with economic espionage, there is 
no custom of reciprocity or cooperation that states should be concerned 
about preserving.  With traditional espionage, which focuses on state-
strategy and military capacity, one can assume that state spying ensures the 
collective security of all nations.  A state’s knowledge about its neighbors’ 
military capabilities allows it to hedge against or prevent a threat.  This, in 
turn, might decrease the likelihood of any successful or surprise attack.  In 
this way, traditional espionage functions as a structural constraint against 
                                                                                                                            
87 Id. at 603 (quoting Demarest, supra note 84, at 347) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Radsan also points to scholars who view peacetime espionage as illegal.  Id. at 604–05. 
88 Id. at 605–06; see Chesterman, supra note 70, at 1090 (“One of the reasons for the unusual 
treatment of espionage in diplomatic relations is the principle of reciprocity—the recognition that what 
one does to another state’s spies will affect that state’s treatment of one’s own agents.  The underlying 
assumption of this arrangement is that intelligence collection is an important or at least an unavoidable 
component of diplomatic relations.”). 
89 Radsan, supra note 79, at 606. 
90 Baker, supra note 80, at 1092. 
91 Radsan, supra note 79, at 606. 
92 See generally Susan W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility 
of the Economic Espionage Act, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 389 (2006) (describing how the nature of 
economic espionage has changed significantly due to the proliferation of information in cyberspace).  
93 See id. at 395–97 (comparing traditional approaches to economic espionage to those used in the 
Internet age). 
94 See id. at 397 (“A victimized government, corporation, or individual today will have an 
exceptionally challenging task [of] merely identifying the cyber collector who has targeted their 
information.  This is, of course, assuming the victim is even aware of the fact that he or she has been 
subject to an attack!”).  
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open conflict and preserves global stability.  Yet there is no such 
corresponding benefit to global security that accrues from economic cyber 
espionage.  In the most likely scenario, the states that perpetrate this 
economic spying are motivated to do so because they are still developing 
and lack desirable technology, innovation, or best practices.95  Therefore, 
no state would be incentivized to preserve its option to return the favor.  
The spying state merely harms the victim state’s incentive to innovate, 
natural comparative advantages, and robustness as a trading partner.96  
For these reasons, it is a mistake not to draw any legal distinction 
between traditional espionage and economic cyber espionage.  Section B 
urges the international community to take seriously a state’s claim that 
such conduct violates well-established norms of international law as they 
are interpreted to apply to this modern problem. 
B.  The International Law Norms Against Economic Cyber Espionage 
The international community has begun to appreciate that the “old 
architecture” of international law is “buckling under the weight of new 
threats.”97  This realization and desire to move forward presents a key 
moment in which international law can evolve to address the growing 
threat of economic cyber espionage.  This Section first considers why the 
time is ripe for this normative evolution and then considers which norms 
must evolve. 
1.  A “Constitutive Process” for Normative Evolution98 
First, one might ask, how is international law made or evolved?  The 
answer to this question is important to any argument for a new 
prescription—after all, there is no definitive “central legislator” for 
                                                                                                                            
95 See LEWIS, supra note 3, at 44–45 (describing the experience of China, where political leaders 
identified “an immense lag” in technology in the post-Mao era and “made the illicit acquisition of 
technology a central element of China’s economic opening to the West”). 
96 See id. at 45 (“The theft of IP and confidential business information . . . appears to cost 
developed countries much more .  . . by damaging economic competitiveness.”). 
97 See supra note 20. 
98 Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman originated this theory by which they “refer to 
authoritative decision as process.”  Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, 
The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 258 (1967).  By this 
theory: 
An examination of the world community context corroborates the view that, within 
limits, a global system of public order has come into existence that comprises a 
constitutive process in which authoritative decision institutions have taken form and 
which utilizes these institutions to protect and extend itself and also to contribute to 
the shaping and sharing of values other than power.  
Id. at 257.  
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international law,99 and the prospect of new law depends, in large part, on 
whether international law’s processes of generating norms are properly 
activated and engaged.100  This is equally true with respect to economic 
cyber espionage.  Even though existing norms can be interpreted to 
prohibit it, deploying these norms in a new way requires some normative 
evolution. 
As Professor Michael Reisman has theorized, international law in the 
contemporary global order is made pursuant to a multi-dimensional, 
“constitutive process.”101  This process is “the context which produces 
international law.”102  By this account, today there are various dimensions 
of the world community that play a role in the shaping of international law, 
including “[t]he economic, environmental and resource dimension of the 
world community.”103  The economic dimension ushers into the 
international law-making process the voices and concerns of various 
players in the transnational market,104 including business entities, 
corporations, and research engines from academia and the non-profit 
sector.  In this modern-day world order, these interests can and do serve to 
generate “new principles and governance structures” to regulate 
international activity,105 as these participants recognize the “utility of 
maintaining and enhancing a stable transnational economic environment 
that enables their various enterprises to flourish.”106  On this theory, 
international law responds and develops not only to the concerns of a 
nation-state, but also to the concerns of the many different players in the 
international order, including those in the private economic sector.107  
This has led to a “contemporary open process of lawmaking” that is 
                                                                                                                            
99 Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 536 (2001).  
100 See McDougal et al., supra note 98, at 255 (discussing “[a] world constitutive process of 
authoritative decision [which] includes the establishment of an authoritative decision process in the 
world community, and its subsequent maintenance, modification, or even termination”). 
101 See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 101–17 
(2012) (discussing “the world constitutive process and its decision functions”); see also McDougal et 
al., supra note 98, at 279–80 (observing that “[t]he outcomes that flow from the constitutive process 
are the decisions that delimit authoritative and controlling participation in the world arena,” including 
“prescriptions” regarding, inter alia, “constitutive norms”). 
102 REISMAN, supra note 101, at 46.  
103 Id. at 58.  “That process is, in the broadest sense, the context which produces international law, 
within which international law and those practising it have to operate, and which, in turn, they are 
trying, in various ways, to direct and regulate.”  Id. at 46. 
104 Id. at 60–61. 
105 Id. at 61. 
106 Id. at 60. 
107 See id. at 137 (“This dynamic and open process of communication involves a wide range of 
non-State actors who play critical roles in the shaping and sustaining of expectations of right 
behaviour.”).  
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“more dynamic and fluid” than before and “often respond[s] to perceptions 
of crisis.”108  A fluid, democratic, and reactive system of international law 
should mean that norms, as they exist, are constantly subject to change and 
growth, responding to the popular concerns of international law’s 
economic participants.109  No longer is international law solely the product 
of lex scripta, that is, the usual state-driven methods of lawmaking such as 
treaties and other international agreements; it may also develop more 
organically.110  
All this is to say that the creation of norms regarding economic cyber 
espionage does not depend on the formal machinery of international 
lawmaking.  Instead, they can evolve immediately, in response to the 
concerns of those affected—business, industry, the media, and the non-
profit world—as states and powerful economic multilateral institutions are 
influenced to reach consensus that such conduct is unlawful.111  
That consensus already has a rallying point in existing principles of 
customary international law.  As derived from the fundamental principle of 
state sovereignty, the following Subsection argues that states enjoy a right 
to economic sovereignty112 that accrues to the state both for its benefit and 
for that of the private economic actors that exist under its aegis.  It also 
argues that states should be held responsible for the cyber espionage that 
they sponsor. 
2.  Economic Sovereignty and the Right to Non-Economic Intervention  
Since the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, the 
global community has ordered itself around a state-based system.113  This 
                                                                                                                            
108 Id.  
109 See REISMAN, supra note 101, at 136–37 (“Thus the modalities through which international 
law is being prescribed now range over a wide spectrum.”); McDougal et al., supra note 98, at 261 
(“All participants in world social process act in the constitutive process of authoritative decision.”).  
110 REISMAN, supra note 101, at 136–37; see also Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, 
The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law Is Made, 6 YALE 
STUDS. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980) (“The making of law is a decision function which may be 
conveniently described as prescription.”).  
111 This Article considers the problem from the perspective of the United States.  To the extent 
other nations and economies are threatened by economic cyber espionage, their interests will also build 
pressure for a change in the normative outlook.  
112 The general idea of economic sovereignty has existed in the academic literature for some time.  
See, e.g., Alan M. Simon & Spencer Weber Waller, A Theory of Economic Sovereignty: An Alternative 
to Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Disputes, 22 STAN. J. INT’L L. 337, 348 (1986) (“Economic 
sovereignty encompasses the right to continue and preserve economic activities closely linked to the 
existence of the state.”).  
113 See JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83 (David Turns ed., 1995) (“The 
general principle of exclusive sovereignty over national territory is firmly established in customary 
international law.  Each State exercises control over its national territory to the exclusion of all other 
States, and any limitation of this authority is subject to the consent of the territorial State.”). 
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Westphalian system places the state and its “sovereignty at its core.”114  
According to international relations scholars, “Westphalian” is “an 
‘institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two 
principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic 
authority structures.’”115  At base, “Westphalian sovereignty is violated 
when external actors influence or determine domestic authority 
structures.”116  
Though the Westphalian version of sovereignty has historically been 
linked to territorial control, the conceptual underpinnings of sovereignty 
are not necessarily limited to land or physical spaces.  Instead, sovereignty 
is a principle that is mainly concerned with protecting national power bases 
and a state’s exclusive right to control them.117  It thus requires that “any 
limitation of this authority is subject to the consent of the . . . State.”118  
Today, a state’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty—the essential aspects 
of its statehood—depends not only on control of its borders, but also on 
control of its economy and private sources of wealth.  Threats to these 
economic aspects of a state’s integrity are increasingly mounted through 
cyberspace.  It follows then that sovereignty also proscribes external 
attempts to manipulate or infringe on a state’s national economic spaces 
(as defined to include the private sector), including those launched in 
cyberspace, even if such acts fall below a conventional threshold of 
force.119  
Customary international law120 also supports an expanded notion of 
                                                                                                                            
114 Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L 
ORG. 251, 251 (2001); see Benjamin Straumann, The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution, 
15 CONSTELLATIONS 173, 173 (2008) (noting that Westphalia is perceived as the “origin” of the 
principle of state sovereignty). 
115 Straumann, supra note 114, at 173 (quoting STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: 
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20 (1999)). 
116 Id. 
117 See KISH, supra note 113, at 84 (“As general rules of international law safeguard the 
sovereignty of every State over its national territory, any limitation of territorial sovereignty depends on 
agreement between the territorial State and other States.”). 
118 Id. at 83.  
119 Others have made the point that sovereignty applies in cyberspace.  See, e.g., Schmitt, supra 
note 63, at 177 (“States have a sovereign right to exercise control over cyberinfrastructure and activities 
on their territory as well as to protect them from harmful actions.”); cf. Chesterman, supra note 70, at 
1081 (noting that sovereignty suggests legal limits on espionage even when it falls below the threshold 
standard defining certain uses of force). 
120 According to Professor Michael Paulsen:  
[Customary international law] refers to the norms and practices of nations, apart 
from treaties or other written agreements.  Within the regime of international law, it 
is “law” inferred from “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them 
from a sense of legal obligation.”  It is, in effect, a body of unwritten international 
“common law” principles.  
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sovereignty, which includes a concept of economic sovereignty that 
protects private sector actors that contribute to the nation’s economic 
security.  As the following discussion shows, international courts and 
tribunals have interpreted state sovereignty and the related principles of 
non-intervention and state responsibility quite broadly, without limiting 
them to the physical domain.121  Particularly where, as here, a global threat 
is new and states have not yet had an opportunity to address it through 
practice, these legal precedents can “influenc[e] the subsequent practice of 
States and international organizations”122 to apply the principle of 
economic sovereignty to prohibit economic cyber espionage.  
a.  A Broad Understanding of Non-Intervention 
A state’s sovereignty confers on it a right to be free from the unwanted 
intervention of another state.123  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
considers this principle of non-intervention part of customary international 
law.124 
In expounding on it, the ICJ expressed a broad view of sovereignty in 
Nicaragua v. United States.125  There, the court considered whether the 
United States’ support to the Nicaraguan contras was justified by the 
fact—if proven—that the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua was 
supplying arms to insurgents in El Salvador.126  To evaluate the United 
States’ justifications, the court considered the “principle of non-
intervention in customary international law.”127  The ICJ found that “the 
support given by the United States, up to the end of September 1984, to the 
military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by 
                                                                                                                            
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 
1800 (2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) 
(1987)).  According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), customary international 
law is “a general practice accepted as law.”  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), 
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060. 
121 The authors of the Tallinn Manual have made this point in their thorough and expert analysis 
of international law in cyberspace.  Specifically, they explain that, based on their conclusion that 
“general principles of international law appl[y] to cyberspace,” it follows that “legal concepts [such] as 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and State responsibility” are part of “international cyber security law.”  
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 14.  They refer to “the hostile use of cyberspace” and these 
principles’ relationship to jus in bello.  Id.; see also Schmitt, supra note 63, at 177 (“[A] thick web of 
international norms suffuses cyberspace.”); infra Parts III.B.3.a–c.  
122 ICRC, Assessment of Customary International Law, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); see id. (“[A] finding by an international 
court that a rule of customary international law exists constitutes persuasive evidence to that effect.”).  
123 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶ 202 (June 27).  
124 KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 30 (2011). 
125 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 201. 
126 Id. ¶¶ 93, 126, 128. 
127 Id. ¶ 201. 
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financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic 
support, constitute[d] a clear breach of the principle of non-
intervention.”128  The court held:  
[I]n international law, if one State, with a view to coercion of 
another State, supports and assists armed bands in that State 
whose purpose is to overthrow the government of that State, 
that amounts to an intervention by the one State in the 
internal affairs of the other, whether or not the political 
objective of the State giving such support and assistance is 
equally far-reaching.129 
In reviewing state practice on non-intervention, the court’s concept of 
sovereignty was broader than physical territory principles:  
As regards . . . the content of the principle of non-
intervention . . . in view of the generally accepted 
formulations, the principle forbids all States or groups of 
States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or 
external affairs of other States.  A prohibited intervention 
must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to 
decide freely.  One of these is the choice of a political, 
economic social and cultural system, and the formulation of 
foreign policy.  Intervention is wrongful when it uses 
methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must 
remain free ones.130  
This ICJ holding confirms that coercion need not be by military force, but 
can result from any impediment to a state’s ability to “decide freely” in 
matters that touch on any aspect of that state’s sovereignty.131  
“[C]oercion,” after all, was held to “define[], and indeed form[] the very 
essence of, prohibited intervention.”132  Arguably, the spying and stealing 
of economic property in cyber space can be seen as a form of coercion that 
impermissibly interferes with both the internal and external affairs of a 
state.133  
                                                                                                                            
128 Id. ¶ 242. 
129 Id. ¶ 241.  
130 Id. ¶ 205.  The Tallinn Manual experts reference the ICJ’s Nicaragua holding during their 
articulations of various cyber security law principles.  E.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 26, 44–
47, 55, 58.  
131 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 205; TRAPP, 
supra note 124, at 31. 
132 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 205.  
133 As others have observed: 
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The Nicaragua decision thus supports an expansive customary norm 
that a state is sovereign in its economic—not only territorial—spaces, and 
that the principle of non-intervention gives rise to prohibitions on a state’s 
interference in that economic space.  The rigorous right to exclusive 
control over a state’s economic affairs should also extend to protect the 
private-sector actors that comprise a critical component of the state’s 
proprietary economic space.  Economic sovereignty, as derived from the 
court’s holding in Nicaragua, therefore imposes obligations on states to 
refrain from interfering with private-sector economic actors through the 
use of coercive tactics like economic cyber espionage.134  As the following 
discussion shows, it also prohibits states from sponsoring or supporting 
such activity. 
b.  State Responsibility Based on Knowledge and Control  
The Corfu Channel case holds that states may be held accountable for 
unlawful activity committed from within its territory if the circumstances 
suggest the state had knowledge of it.135  Corfu Channel involved a dispute 
between the United Kingdom and Albania that was brought before the ICJ 
in 1947.136  The case involved whether, among other things, Albania was 
responsible for laying mines that were struck by British ships while 
crossing the Corfu Channel in 1946.137  The Channel had been declared 
free of mines in 1944, and so Britain argued that the mines had been 
recently laid, either by Albania or “with its connivance or knowledge.”138 
On April 9, 1949, the ICJ rendered its decision as to whether Albania 
could be held responsible for the mines.139  Since there was no direct 
                                                                                                                            
[T]he ICJ held that US financing of the contras did not amount to a breach of the 
prohibition of the use of force, although it was an illegal intervention in the domestic 
affairs of Nicaragua.  By analogy, assistance with diplomatic assets or providing 
transportation or intelligence, none of which, by themselves, imply a use of force, 
could amount to a breach of the principle of non-intervention, but not the prohibition 
of the use of force. 
TRAPP, supra note 124, at 31–32 (footnote omitted). 
134 Cf. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of Judge 
Alvarez) (“Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on them.”). 
135 See id. at 18, 22–23 (majority opinion) (finding that Albania must have had knowledge of the 
mines that were in Albanian waters and that they were therefore responsible for their explosion).  The 
Tallinn Manual interprets this opinion to mean that “[t]he obligation to respect the sovereignty of 
another State . . . implies that a State may not ‘allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary 
to the rights of other States.’”  TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 26 (quoting Corfu Channel, 1949 
I.C.J. at 22).  
136 Application Instituting Proceedings in Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 8, 8 (May 22, 
1947). 
137 Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 27–28.  
138 Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 19, ¶¶ 73, 
76 (Sept. 30, 1947). 
139 Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 23. 
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evidence that Albania had known about the mines, the court considered 
circumstantial evidence.140  The court found it “clearly established that the 
Albanian Government constantly kept a close watch” over the Channel, as 
evidenced by certain diplomatic notes protesting the passage of ships 
through the Channel as well as earlier firings on British ships.141  This 
evidence persuaded the court that “whoever the authors of the minelaying 
were, it could not have been done without the Albanian Government’s 
knowledge.”142  The court’s holding in this regard confirmed that 
circumstantial evidence of a state’s knowledge of an unlawful act 
committed within its territory can, in certain circumstances, be sufficient 
for holding that state responsible for it. 
The principle of state responsibility evolved with the ICJ’s decision in 
Nicaragua v. United States.143  There, the court further refined the 
parameters of state responsibility and established an “effective control” test 
for attributing acts of non-state actors to the state.144  But perhaps more 
important for economic cyber espionage was the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s critical analysis of the Nicaragua test 
in Prosecutor v. Tadic.145  In that case, the Appeals Chamber concluded 
that, with respect to organized groups, “overall control” should be the 
operative test, that is, whether the “state . . . has a role in organizing, 
coordinating or planning the military actions of the . . . group.”146  After 
Nicaragua and Tadic, a state may be held responsible for the unlawful 
actions of those putative non-state actors on its territory where the state has 
knowledge of this activity and some role in its orchestration.  Precisely as 
Michael Schmitt points out, “international law . . . obligates states to 
ensure that cyberinfrastructure on their territory is not used for acts that 
unlawfully affect other states.”147   
                                                                                                                            
140 Id. at 18. 
141 Id. at 18–19.  It also considered expert evidence that any minelayers would have been seen by 
Albanian lookouts.  Id. at 20–22.  
142 Id. at 17.  The U.K. advanced this theory, id., and following an examination of the facts, the 
court agreed, id. at 22. 
143 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 
(June 27). 
144 Id. ¶ 20. 
145 Case No IT-94-1-A, Judgment (July 15, 1999). 
146 Id. ¶¶ 120, 137.  With respect to individuals, the Appeals Chamber stated: 
[I]f it is proved that individuals who are not regarded as organs of a State by its 
legislation nevertheless do in fact act on behalf of that State, their acts are 
attributable to the State.  The rationale behind this rule is to prevent States from 
escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry out tasks 
that may not or should not be performed by State officials. 
Id. ¶ 117.  Such individuals, however, must have “specific instructions or directives” to commit 
unlawful acts if the state is to be held responsible.  Id. ¶ 132.  
147 Schmitt, supra note 63, at 177. 
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A robust notion of state responsibility, derived from this case law, is 
necessary to bring economic cyber espionage within the bounds of the 
law—as this conduct is typically shrouded in state denial and therefore 
difficult to attribute directly to a state.  
c.  The Law of Armed Conflict 
International law scholars and military specialists have begun to 
consider how the law of armed conflict applies to large-scale, kinetic-level 
cyber attacks.148  One leading result of this effort is the Tallinn Manual, 
published by law-of-war scholars in 2013.149  The Tallinn Manual 
considers “[t]he legality of cyber intelligence activities . . . as they relate to 
the jus ad bellum notions of ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’, or as 
relevant in the context of an armed conflict governed by the jus in 
bello.”150  The Tallinn Manual is not, however, addressed to “[c]yber 
activities that occur below the level of a ‘use of force,’ . . . like cyber 
criminality.”151  Nevertheless, several of the underlying principles 
discussed in the Tallinn Manual indirectly suggest a basis for holding 
states accountable for economic cyber espionage. 
For example, according to Rule 1 of the Tallinn Manual, “A cyber 
operation by a State directed against cyber infrastructure located in another 
State may violate the latter’s sovereignty.”152  The experts note that, 
although the traditional “violation of sovereignty was limited to actions by, 
or attributable to States . . . there is an embryonic view proffered by some 
                                                                                                                            
148 For examples of recent commentary on this subject, see generally Michael Gervais, Cyber 
Attacks and the Law of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525 (2012), Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the 
Use of Force in Cyber Space: The Application of the Law of Armed Conflict During a Time of 
Fundamental Change in the Nature of Warfare, 60 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2010), and Matthew C. Waxman, 
Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421 
(2011). 
149 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7.  The Tallinn Manual “results from an expert-driven process 
designed to produce a non-binding document applying existing law to cyber warfare” and “examines 
the international law governing ‘cyber warfare.’”  Id. at 1, 3.  The Tallinn Manual also speaks generally 
to how traditional principles or rules of international law apply to cyberspace.  Id. pt. I. 
150 Id. at 3–4.  This Article agrees that a counter-response of force would not be an appropriate 
response to economic cyber espionage, and argues that this threat should be contained with a rule of 
law response.  Others have suggested differently.  See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 63, at 178 (“[I]t is 
questionable whether the historic exclusion of economic warfare should be interpreted as extending to 
cyberoperations that generate dramatic economic consequences.”).  NATO has also issued an advisory 
manual that discusses “how international law applies to online attacks by the state, and warns that 
online attacks could lead to full-blown military conflicts.”  Hayley Dixon, Rules of Cyberwar Set Out 
for First Time in NATO Manual, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
9939401/Rules-of-cyberwar-set-out-for-first-time-in-Nato-manual.html.  The manual was authored by 
NATO’s Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and “defines a cyber attack as one that is 
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
151 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 3–4.  
152 Id. at 16.  
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scholars that cyber operations conducted by non-State actors may also 
violate a State’s sovereignty.”153  Also, pursuant to Rule 6, “[a] State bears 
international responsibility for a cyber operation attributable to it and 
which constitutes a breach of an international obligation.”154  And “persons 
or entities” that are “specifically empowered” by the state are, for purposes 
of international law, “equated to State organs,” including private entities 
“granted the authority . . . to engage in cyber intelligence gathering.”155 
Again, the Tallinn Manual stops short of applying the law of state 
responsibility to economic cyber espionage, noting “international law does 
not address espionage per se” and it therefore cannot “amount to an 
‘internationally wrongful act.’”156  However, to the extent this Article 
argues that economic cyber espionage is distinct from traditional espionage 
and violates a state’s economic sovereignty in a more coercive way, the 
Tallinn Manual’s rules may be relevant to those acts.  
* * * 
The foregoing Part demonstrated that, although international law is not 
often mobilized to combat instances of traditional espionage, economic 
cyber espionage should be treated differently.  It is more coercive than 
traditional espionage insofar as it deprives a state of exclusive control of its 
economic space (a key source of power), and therefore directly violates the 
right to economic sovereignty and causes concrete harm to the state.  From 
this it follows that a state which controls, directs, acknowledges, or 
supports cyber espionage against another state may be held responsible 
under the international law doctrine of state responsibility, provided there 
is knowledge and some appropriate level of control over the groups or 
entities (or even individuals) that engage in it. 
Applying these customary norms to economic espionage, however, is 
not enough.  In order to make a norm against economic cyber espionage 
meaningful, it must truly become state practice.  And in order for that state 
recognition to take hold, there must be an institutional mechanism 
available for states to assert a claim for economic cyber espionage.  That 
mechanism must also have the ability to ensure compliance through a 
credible means of rendering a decision and enforcing it.  The next Part 
argues that the WTO is the proper institutional mechanism for channeling 
these norms into state practice.  
                                                                                                                            
153 Id. at 18.  
154 Id. at 29.  
155 Id. at 31.  
156 Id. at 30.  
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IV.  DEVELOPING STATE PRACTICE AGAINST ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: 
ASSERTING CLAIMS IN THE WTO 
A norm is of little value without a legal mechanism to enforce it.  
Where Part III considered the problem of anormativity in the area of 
economic cyber espionage, this Part considers and proposes a solution to 
the lack of institutional implementation arrangements.  Focusing on 
recognition and enforcement of the norm against economic cyber 
espionage, it considers how a victim state might assert a claim for the 
violation of its economic sovereignty caused by the continued use of 
economic cyber espionage.  This Part argues that an international 
economic institution like the WTO is the most appropriate and effective 
forum for regulating economic cyber espionage, particularly when 
perpetrated by states motivated by the simultaneous desire for economic 
expansion and economic integration, such as China.  The WTO provides a 
legal framework already dedicated to fair trade and competition, and it has 
the power and authority necessary to ensure compliance with its 
judgments.  
This Part first considers how the WTO rules of law fit together with 
the customary principles developed in Part III.  It argues that certain WTO 
rules, when considered through the lens of a contemporary right to 
economic sovereignty, protect member states against economic cyber 
espionage.  This Part also argues that the right to economic sovereignty—
and a state’s corresponding obligation to refrain from economic cyber 
espionage—can be asserted within the WTO’s existing dispute settlement 
framework.  Finally, this Part details how a trade-based system would be 
effective in halting and deterring illegal cyber conduct in the case of China. 
A.  WTO Law and the Norm of Economic Sovereignty 
1.  WTO Treaty-Based Protections of Intellectual Property  
The WTO is a multilateral economic institution157 that provides for, 
among other trade-related rights, rigorous protection of intellectual and 
industrial property rights between member states through its treaties and 
various agreements.158  The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
                                                                                                                            
157 See What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (“Most 
nations—including almost all the main trading nations—are members of the system.  But some are not, 
so ‘multilateral’ is used to describe the system instead of ‘global’ or ‘world.’”). 
158 The United States and China are both member states.  For a full list of membership, see 
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/or
g6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  For a very basic overview of the treatment of intellectual 
property in the WTO, see WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 39–43 (2011) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/underst
anding_e.pdf.  
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of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was negotiated during the 1986–
1994 Uruguay Round of trade talks.159  TRIPS “introduced intellectual 
property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time.”160  
The goal of the Agreement is to “narrow the gaps in the way these rights 
are protected around the world, and to bring them under common 
international rules.”161  Importantly, the Agreement “establishes minimum 
levels of protection that each government has to give the intellectual 
property of fellow WTO members.”162  Specifically, the second part of the 
TRIPS Agreement considers exactly how to protect certain kinds of 
intellectual property rights and takes as its “starting point” the obligations 
set out in the main international agreements of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO).163  
The TRIPS Agreement and the conventions it incorporates protect 
several substantive rights related to economic cyber espionage.  For 
example, it protects “[t]rade secrets and other types of ‘undisclosed 
information’ which have commercial value.”164  This information “must be 
protected against breach of confidence and other acts contrary to honest 
commercial practices.”165  The TRIPS Agreement also protects industrial 
designs166 and provides for national treatment regarding industrial property 
by incorporating the Paris Convention of 1883, which states “each 
contracting State must grant the same protection to nationals of the other 
contracting States as it grants to its own nationals.”167  Through that 
Convention, TRIPS also sets out a common rule that “[e]ach contracting 
State must provide for effective protection against unfair competition.”168  
And TRIPS protects copyrights, including computer programs and 
                                                                                                                            
159 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 158, at 39.  For a general description of the Uruguay 
Round, see The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  
160 Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter WTO IP Protection and Enforcement]. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. (emphasis added). 
163 Id.  The first part of the Agreement deals with basic principles.  Those principles include 
national treatment (“treating one’s own nationals and foreigners equally”), and most-favored-nation 
treatment (“equal treatment for nationals of all trading partners in the WTO”).  Id.  
164 Id.; see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (pronouncing that member states have a duty to 
protect undisclosed information). 
165 WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160. 
166 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, arts. 25–26.  
167 Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014). 
168 Id.  
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databases within the scope of protection.169  Patent protection is likewise 
broad: “[p]atent protection must be available for both products and 
processes, in almost all fields of technology.”170  
Together, these rights and enforcement principles suggest two things 
relevant to economic cyber espionage.  First, the rules require member 
states to protect innovative economic activity that is not necessarily 
developed or owned by the state itself, but rather by private economic 
actors.171  Second, member states are bound to protect one another’s 
intellectual property and refrain from any activity that impedes those 
rights.172  At first blush, the WTO thus appears an obvious forum for 
asserting complaints about economic cyber espionage.  Indeed, some 
experts already “have argued that the United States should use 
international trade law’s protections for intellectual property against 
countries engaged in economic cyber espionage.”173  
However, WTO members have apparently “shown no interest” in 
pursuing this path, “despite mounting worries about this practice.”174  And 
the United States has not yet pursued any claim against China for 
economic cyber espionage through the WTO.175  This reluctance appears to 
stem, in part, from an overly narrow interpretation of the TRIPS rules.  As 
David Fidler points out, WTO members would likely agree that to 
“covertly obtain intellectual property of nationals of other WTO members 
operating in their territories could violate WTO obligations to protect such 
property.”176  But whether members would also consider WTO rules 
violated where a member state obtained such “information from private 
sector entities located outside their territories” remains an open question.177  
Member states may thus assume that there is no basis for claiming 
                                                                                                                            
169 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, arts. 9–10. 
170 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 158, at 41; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, 
arts. 27–34 (outlining the patent-related rights of member states). 
171 Cf. Geoffrey D. Antell, Book Note, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 527, 527 (2005) (reviewing GREGORY 
SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003)) 
(“[A]lthough only WTO Member States can bring litigation before the WTO, private actors such as 
corporations and activists play an important role in states’ decisions about which cases to bring.”). 
172 WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160.  
173 Fidler, supra note 77, at 3; see also LEWIS, supra note 3, at 49 (suggesting that the United 
States should pursue cyber espionage and intellectual property theft claims against China in the WTO).  
174 Fidler, supra note 77, at 3.  
175 The Wall Street Journal recently reported that some U.S. officials may consider WTO action 
as one of several options.  Siobhan Gorman et al., U.S. to Rev Up Hacking Fight, WALL ST. J., May 23, 
2014, at A1.  To date, however, the United States has brought only one case directly against China in 
the WTO under TRIPS and it did not pertain to cyber espionage.  China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
176 Fidler, supra note 77, at 3.  
177 Id. (emphasis added); see id. (stating that WTO cases have not involved “accusations against 
government-sponsored espionage”). 
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economic cyber espionage violates the TRIPS Agreement because “WTO 
rules create obligations for WTO members to fulfill within their territories 
and do not generally impose duties that apply outside those limits.”178  
This assumption may prove too much.  If a member state’s actions 
taken from within its territory infringe on another member state’s 
intellectual property rights, should not the WTO rules apply?  That the 
harm is done in cyber space seems a poor reason to limit application of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which was, in any event, negotiated before the rise of 
cyber threats to trade and intellectual property rights.  After all, the general 
goals of the TRIPS Agreement, found in its preamble, are to “reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade . . . [and] promote 
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights.”179  In 
short, to remain relevant, the WTO Agreements must consider the 
possibility of cyber violations. 
Further, the fact that the WTO rules are silent as to economic cyber 
espionage is not an indication that those rules do not apply.  The next 
Subsection explains why the scope of the WTO agreements should be 
determined by reference to modernized norms of economic sovereignty 
and non-intervention in economic affairs180 and argues that the TRIPS 
Agreement should, in fact, be recognized to protect member states against 
the economic cyber espionage of other member states.  
2.  Customary International Law and WTO Treaty-Based Rules 
Though TRIPS may not address economic cyber espionage explicitly, 
its rules may nevertheless be interpreted to prohibit that conduct, 
particularly when general international law suggests that they should.  A 
prevailing view is that “[g]eneral international law fills the gaps left by 
treaties,” unless there is a conflict between the provisions or an express 
exclusion of the customary principle.181  Otherwise, “[e]very international 
convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general principles of 
international law for all questions which it does not itself resolve in express 
terms and in a different way.”182   
More specifically, it is well-accepted that general international law 
applies in the WTO.  Joost Pauwelyn explains that “WTO rules are part of 
                                                                                                                            
178 Id.  
179 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, pmbl. 
180 See supra Part III.B (discussing states’ rights to economic sovereignty, rights to non-economic 
intervention, and responsibility for the sponsorship of non-state cyber espionage).  
181 Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 536; see id. at 542 (“In international law, there is . . . a 
presumption in favor of continuity or against conflict, in the sense that if a treaty does not contract out 
of a preexisting rule, that rule (being of the same inherent value as the new one) continues to exist.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
182 Id. at 541 (quoting Pinson v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 327, 422 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1928)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the wider corpus of public international law” and are properly considered 
“rules of international law that . . . constitute lex specialis vis-à-vis certain 
rules of general international law.”183  Accordingly, those non-WTO rules 
that existed before the WTO treaty was signed on April 15, 1994, and are 
“relevant to and may have an impact on WTO rules[,] and . . . have not 
been contracted out of, deviated from, or replaced by the WTO treaty” 
continue to apply.184  The same is true for “non-WTO rules that are created 
subsequently to the WTO treaty . . . and . . . are relevant to and may have 
an impact on WTO rules” and “add to or confirm existing WTO rules.”185  
All of these non-WTO rules, which “consist mainly of general 
international law,”186 would therefore include customary norms of 
economic sovereignty and non-intervention in economic affairs as 
interpreted to proscribe economic cyber espionage.  This gap-filling 
function of non-conflicting customary norms is explicitly confirmed in 
Article 3.2 of the DSU.187  It states “that WTO covered agreements must be 
clarified ‘in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.’”188  
The WTO case law has followed this approach and resorted to 
customary international law for interpretive supplementation.  As the panel 
in Korea—“Government Procurement” generally explained: 
Customary international law applies generally to the 
economic relations between the WTO members. . . . [T]o the 
extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression 
in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are 
of the view that the customary rules of international law 
apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty 
formation under the WTO.189  
This statement mirrored the view expressed by the panel in United States—
“Gasoline” that WTO agreements should “not . . . be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law.”190 
WTO cases have thus accepted that the customary principle of good 
faith is useful in interpreting member states’ performance of their treaty 
                                                                                                                            
183 Id. at 538, 539. 
184 Id. at 540. 
185 Id. at 541. 
186 Id. at 540. 
187 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401 [hereinafter DSU].  
188 Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 542 (quoting DSU, supra note 187, art. 3.2).   
189 Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96, WT/DS163/R 
(May 1, 2000). 
190 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, ¶ 17, WT/DS2/R (Apr. 29, 1996).  
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obligations.  For example, the United States—“EC Hormones” panel 
explained that “[g]ood faith is a general principle of international law that 
governs all reciprocal actions of States,” and therefore “agree[d] with the 
European Communities that every party to an international agreement must 
be presumed to be performing its obligation under that agreement in good 
faith.”191  The appellate body in United States—“Hot-Rolled Steel” also 
relied on the principle of good faith in interpreting the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.192  In examining paragraph 2 of Annex II in light of a good 
faith obligation, the appellate body found that a state’s investigating 
authority was prevented from imposing unreasonable burdens on 
exporters.193 
WTO panels have referred to other customary principles as well, 
including notions of state responsibility.  For example, the panel in 
Turkey—“Textiles” considered whether Turkey was responsible for certain 
quantitative restrictive import measures taken by the Turkey-EC customs 
union.194  Among other reasons for holding Turkey responsible, the panel 
concluded that “in public international law, in the absence of any contrary 
treaty provision, Turkey could reasonably be held responsible for the 
measures taken by the Turkey EC customs union.”195  Similarly, the 
Australia—“Salmon” panel referred both to general international law and 
WTO law to determine that certain import measures taken by Tasmania 
were to be “regarded as a measure taken by Australia.”196  The WTO case 
law thus supports Pauwelyn’s thesis that “[t]he WTO is not a secluded 
island but part of the territorial domain of international law” and that 
“public international law . . . is enriching and continues to enrich WTO 
law.”197 
The WTO agreements’ silence on the issue of cyber trade violations 
presents a classic situation in which customary principles should be 
                                                                                                                            
191 Panel Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones 
Dispute, ¶ 7.317, WT/DS320/R, modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS320/AB/R (Nov. 14, 
2008); see also Anastasios Gourgourinis, Lex Specialis in WTO and Investment Protection Law 24 
(Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 2010/37, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1634051 (discussing the EC-Hormones case). 
192 Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel 
Products from Japan, ¶ 101, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 21, 2001).  
193 Id. ¶ 102.  
194 Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶¶ 8.3, 9.33-
9.35, WT/DS34/R, modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS34/AB/R (Nov. 19, 1999). 
195 Id. ¶ 9.42; see Gourgourinis, supra note 191, at 23 (describing how the panel resorted to 
customary international law because the agreements did not specifically address the issue); see also 
HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 152 (2011) (noting that 
this case could suggest “that complicit State action could potentially also lead to findings of non-
compliance with GATT obligations by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism”). 
196 Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon—Recourse to Article 21.5 
by Canada, ¶ 7.12, WT DS184/AB/R (Feb. 18, 2000). 
197 Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 552.  
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consulted to interpret the agreements’ scope and applicability in this 
domain.  No TRIPS provision has explicitly (and entirely) contracted out 
of the fundamental tenants of state sovereignty and state responsibility.198  
Nor is TRIPS inconsistent with these general principles.  The economic 
corollaries of sovereignty and non-intervention—in addition to the well-
recognized requirement to comply with one’s treaty obligations in good 
faith—should therefore give rise to a cognizable claim that economic cyber 
espionage violates TRIPS.199  On this view, the WTO agreements would 
not exclude a claim of economic cyber espionage simply because the 
conduct “involves governments obtaining information from private-sector 
companies located outside their territories.”200  Arguably, it would be 
contrary to both the letter and spirit of the WTO agreements to fail to 
recognize such a claim.  
3.  The WTO Mechanisms for Enforcement   
As a global matter, the TRIPS Agreement takes the existence of 
intellectual property rights seriously, and duly recognizes the need for 
enforcement, as “[h]aving intellectual property laws is not enough.  They 
have to be enforced.”201  Part III of the TRIPS Agreement is thus 
specifically dedicated to enforcement and imposes a requirement upon 
governments “to ensure that intellectual property rights can be enforced 
under their laws, and that penalties for infringement are tough enough to 
deter . . . violations.”202  Consistent with the spirit of rigorous enforcement, 
the DSU has broad jurisdiction in construing what constitutes a claim: 
“WTO rules have an ‘all-affecting’ character, which means that even 
                                                                                                                            
198 The DSU has apparently contracted out of some general rules on state responsibility.  
Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 539.  However, at least some scholars believe that the principles of state 
responsibility remain relevant to WTO claims.  See id. at 542 & n.51 (positing, as a matter of treaty 
interpretation, that it is “not so clear” that the DSU completely contracted out of state responsibility 
rules).  In addition to those WTO cases discussed above, others have considered this customary 
principle in their decisions.  For example, the Appellate Body referred to customary principles of state 
responsibility, as set out by the ILC, to interpret the definition of a “public body” in the context of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  See WTO Analytical Index: 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
analytic_index_e/dsu_10_e.htm#1683 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (discussing the US—Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties case); see also id. (discussing the Canada—Dairy case in which the Panel 
also resorted to the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility to determine whether a particular entity 
had acted pursuant to delegated government authority and could therefore be considered an “agency” of 
the Canadian government). 
199 See Gourgourinis, supra note 191, at 22 (referring to the customary countermeasure defense 
and arguing that to “the extent that WTO treaties do not explicitly . . . contract-out” from a particular 
aspect of customary law, these norms remain available “to raise in WTO adjudication so as to justify 
WTO violations”). 
200 Fidler, supra note 77, at 3.  
201 WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160. 
202 Id.  
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disputes with a relatively limited trade aspect can be brought before the 
WTO.”203  Arguably, with such a broad enforcement prerogative, the 
principles of economic sovereignty and non-economic intervention would 
be proper parts of a member state’s claim that TRIPS rules have been 
violated by economic cyber espionage. 
However, even if economic cyber espionage was not recognized as a 
direct violation of the TRIPS Agreement, the behavior should be 
actionable as a non-violation complaint.  Non-violation complaints allow a 
member state to appeal to the Dispute Settlement Body in certain 
circumstances where an agreement has not been directly violated.204  They 
are “allowed if one government can show that it has been deprived of an 
expected benefit because of another government’s action, or because of 
any other situation that exists.  The aim [of the non-violation complaint] is 
to help preserve the balance of benefits struck during multilateral 
negotiations.”205  The provision allowing for such claims is found in 
Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which provides, in relevant part: 
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is 
being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any 
objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its 
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by 
another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the 
existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, 
with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make 
written representations or proposals to the other contracting 
party or parties which it considers to be concerned.  Any 
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic 
consideration to the representations or proposals made to 
it.206 
Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement, which deals with dispute settlement, 
refers to Article XXIII(1) of GATT,207 suggesting non-violation complaints 
                                                                                                                            
203 Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 553. 
204 TRIPS: “Non-Violation” Complaints (Article 64.2), Background and the Current Situation, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/nonviolation_background_e.htm 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter TRIPS: Non-Violation Complaints].  
205 Id.  
206 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT].  
207 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, art. 64.1. 
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are in theory possible under TRIPS.208  
However, there is currently a moratorium on the use of non-violation 
complaints in connection with TRIPS set out under Article 64.2 of 
TRIPS.209  The moratorium was most recently extended to December 2015 
at the Ministerial Conference held in December 2013.210  When the issue is 
revisited, there are several reasons why the TRIPS Council should 
recommend that TRIPS-related non-violation complaints be allowed in the 
limited circumstance of economic cyber espionage.211   
For one, non-violation complaints are designed to handle trade 
disputes and disruptions of precisely the type posed by economic cyber 
espionage.  Consider the text of Article XXIII.  A member state that is a 
victim of economic cyber espionage of the magnitude described above212 
can undoubtedly “consider” that a benefit under the TRIPS Agreement—
namely, the rigorous protection of its intellectual property and trade 
secrets—is being “nullified or impaired” by that conduct.213  Such claims 
would also be consistent with the purpose of the non-violation complaint, 
which was initially envisioned by members to provide a “remedy against 
actions that are not inconsistent with [WTO] rights and obligations” but 
which actions constitute “measures that comply with the letter of the 
agreement, but nevertheless frustrate one of its objectives or undermine 
trade commitments contained in the agreement.”214  If economic cyber 
espionage may evade censure as a violation of a TRIPS rule merely 
because the intellectual property harm occurs outside the violator’s 
physical territory, that activity nonetheless frustrates a core objective of the 
TRIPS Agreement—to safeguard the “minimum levels of protection that 
each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO 
members.”215  
                                                                                                                            
208 Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Dispute in the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_E/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c4s5p1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 
15, 2014). 
209 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, art. 64.2 (outlining a five year moratorium); see also 
TRIPS: Non-Violation Complaints, supra note 204 (“[F]or the time being, members have agreed not to 
use [non-violation complaints] under the TRIPS Agreement.”). 
210 Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/thewto
_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desci31_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
211 In past discussions, the TRIPS Council considered four options: “(1) banning non-violation 
complaints in TRIPS completely, (2) allowing the complaints to be handled under the WTO’s dispute 
settlement rules as applied to goods and services cases, (3) allowing non-violation complaints but 
subject to special ‘modalities’ (i.e., ways of dealing with them), and (4) extending the moratorium.”  
TRIPS: Non-Violation Complaints, supra note 204.  
212 See supra Part I.   
213 GATT, supra note 206, art. XXIII. 
214 Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints and Required Allegations in GATT 1994, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c4s2p2_e.ht
m (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints]. 
215 WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160. 
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Moreover, given the rigorous requirements for asserting a non-
violation complaint,216 there is little reason to fear that allowing a limited 
exception to the moratorium for complaints of economic cyber espionage 
would open up a Pandora’s Box of attempted claims.  Article 26.1 of the 
DSU requires the complainant in a non-violation case to “present a detailed 
justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does 
not conflict with the relevant covered agreement;”217 this complaint must 
satisfy the criteria set out in Article XXIII.218 
The United States’ hypothetical claim against China is instructive.  Per 
the doctrine of state responsibility, there appears to be circumstantial (if 
not direct) evidence of China’s knowledge and overall control219 of certain 
cyber espionage measures taken against the United States’ intellectual 
property interests.220  With respect to a relevant right or “benefit accruing” 
under the TRIPS Agreement, the United States could argue that it has a 
legitimate expectation to every possible market opportunity flowing from 
any innovation or industrial design originating in its private sector.221  That 
benefit is “nullified or impaired” when economic cyber espionage “has the 
effect of upsetting the competitive relationship” of the parties.222  Lastly, 
the United States might claim that it “was not able to reasonably anticipate 
the application of [economic cyber espionage] when it was negotiating” 
                                                                                                                            
216 See generally GATT, supra note 206, art. XXIII (outlining the requisite procedures for making 
a non-violation complaint).  The requirements can be summarized as follows: 
The text of Article XXIII:1(b), combined with the concept of nullification or 
impairment of a benefit gives rise to three conditions whose existence a complainant 
must establish, in order to be successful with a non-violation complaint.  These three 
conditions are: (1) the application of a measure by a Member of the WTO; (2) the 
existence of a benefit accruing under the applicable agreement; and (3) the 
nullification or impairment of a benefit as a result of the application of the measure. 
Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints, supra note 214.  
217 DSU, supra note 187, art. 26.1(a). 
218 See supra note 216. 
219 As Fidler points out, “Even if a WTO member could construct a claim that economic cyber 
espionage violates a WTO rule, it would have to establish that another WTO member’s government is 
responsible for the infringing acts.”  Fidler, supra note 77, at 3. 
220 See supra notes 8–9, 68 and accompanying text.  This is key because “[p]urely private 
conduct, taken by itself, would not satisfy this condition.  If a government simply tolerates private 
restrictive conduct, this also could not be challenged with the non-violation complaint.”  Legal Basis 
for a Dispute: Types of Complaints, supra note 214.  However, “[a] different situation is that where the 
government actively supports or encourages such private actions.”  Id.  The recent criminal indictment 
against Chinese military actors alleges a direct link with China, but it remains to be seen whether the 
United States will be able to prove this link.  Furthermore, in the future, such direct links may not be 
provable and thus the ability to prove state responsibility through circumstantial evidence remains 
important. 
221 Cf. Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints, supra note 214 (noting that complaining 
parties have been able to point to “the legitimate expectation of improved market access opportunities 
resulting from the relevant tariff concessions” as a relevant benefit). 
222 Id. 
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any aspect of its trade relationship with China.223  It would be difficult, 
however, for member states to credibly make similar claims in cases of less 
serious, low-grade cyber-related trade conduct.  Therefore, although large-
scale economic cyber espionage would meet the criteria for a non-violation 
complaint, most other conduct that was simply nettlesome to trade would 
not.  In this way, non-violation complaints for economic cyber espionage 
would remain an “exceptional remedy.”224 
The possibility of violation or non-violation complaints under TRIPS 
makes the WTO an appropriate legal framework for asserting claims 
against members that engage in economic cyber espionage.  The next 
Section argues why the WTO is also the most effective multilateral 
institution to manage this process.  Although the Article uses the case of 
China as an example, the point remains equally true with respect to other 
states that have conducted economic cyber espionage in the current 
normative and institutional fogginess that exists in international law and 
may be driven by similar strategic needs for domestic economic expansion 
and global economic integration. 
B.  The WTO as a Credible Source of Power and Authority225 
As conceptualized above, the WTO treaty-based framework is 
designed to protect intellectual property and trade secrets.  This framework 
is compatible with and reinforces the norms of economic sovereignty and 
non-economic intervention, as well as the principle that states should be 
held responsible for the unlawful economic acts that they sponsor.  But 
equally important to the existence of these norms under international law is 
the ability of the WTO to command compliance.  This Section argues that 
the WTO members should recognize claims asserted for economic cyber 
espionage not only because the WTO agreements allow it, but also because 
the WTO is the most effective institution to vindicate these rights as a 
matter of credibility, power, and authority.226  
                                                                                                                            
223 Id.  
224 Id. (quoting Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
Paper, ¶ 10.37, WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998)).  
225 I am indebted to Professor Michael Reisman who taught me to think about the policy 
dimension of international law along these lines. 
226 Other solutions have been proposed.  For example, Dennis Blair and John Huntsman have 
recommended: 
[I]mmediately: denying products that contain stolen intellectual property access to 
the U.S. market; restricting use of the U.S. financial system to foreign companies 
that repeatedly steal intellectual property; and adding the correct, legal handling of 
intellectual property to the criteria for both investment in the United States under 
Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) approval and for 
foreign companies that are listed on U.S. stock exchanges.  
Blair & Huntsman, supra note 6 (emphasis omitted). 
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1.  The WTO Has Power and Authority that Aspiring Superpower 
States Will Respect 
To be effective, rules of law must be backed by the perceived authority 
to decide that those rules apply and the power to command compliance.227  
There are several reasons why the WTO holds this power and authority 
and, as such, is the most effective multilateral institution to decide disputes 
over economic cyber espionage. 
In the case of China, for example, the WTO is a necessary and critical 
element of its rise to superpower status—China’s rise, which is predicated 
on economic expansion, depends on the continued embrace of the world 
economic community.228  Its inability to participate in the WTO and trade 
with its members—especially the United States—would be deleterious to 
that goal.229  Although China aspires to “leap from a poor isolated nation to 
a global economic superpower,” if it “fails to evolve toward more 
responsible behavior both abroad and at home, a backlash that is already 
forming in the United States and among its neighbors will swell.”230  
Because China needs the WTO’s support, that institution holds real power 
over China and stands as a source of authoritative decisionmaking.   
The WTO also holds symbolic power and authority over China.231  
Participation in this club is an important sign of China’s acceptance by the 
world’s most powerful trading states and, by proxy, its own rising 
economic status.  For these reasons, the WTO’s approbation of economic 
cyber espionage would serve to mark such norm or rule as “legally 
meaningful and effective.”232 
Finally, the WTO is also a credible source of authority.  To be 
effective, “[l]egal arrangements must also include credible commitments to 
apply the resources necessary to make them effective, as the expectation 
that there are such commitments and that they will be applied in the event 
of deviance from the arrangement is an important factor in compliance.”233  
Once WTO members recognize economic cyber espionage as a violation of 
                                                                                                                            
227 See REISMAN, supra note 101, at 95–100 (discussing authoritative power as a requirement for 
“any effective legal arrangement” in the context of international law and politics).  
228 See supra Part II.A (discussing China’s pressures to rise and dependence on integration within 
the international economic order). 
229 See Karabell, supra note 42 (noting that “[t]housands of Chinese companies depend on the 
U.S. market, and on continued exposure to American businesses as they turn to serve a burgeoning 
domestic Chinese consumer market”).  
230 The China Moment, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, at A14. 
231 See REISMAN, supra note 101, at 77 (“Symbols of authority are a factor that contributes toward 
compliance.”).  
232 See id. (“Legal communications are distinguished from the daily bombardment of ‘you 
shoulds’ and ‘you-oughts’ by the fact that they are accompanied by (i) symbols of authority and (ii) 
commitments of control.  Together the signals of authority and control serve to mark the 
communications they attend as legally meaningful and effective.”).  
233 Id.  
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the covered agreements, through the application and incorporation of 
customary norms, then the full weight of the DSU mechanisms become 
available.234  The dispute resolution mechanism—and its ability to require 
a violating state to bring its law and policy into conformance—represents a 
credible commitment of resources to enforcing a legal proscription against 
economic cyber espionage.  In fact, with the WTO’s power and authority 
looming large, even the threat of a claim against China could go far in 
deterring its conduct.235 
2.  The WTO Presents a Palatable Solution 
Efforts to secure compliance and to deter unwanted conduct are also 
well-served by presenting a solution that the violator perceives to be in its 
interest or, at least, palatable.  Providing such a face-saving solution that is 
considered acceptable, from an appearances perspective, is often critical in 
resolving or mediating a conflict.236  This is especially important where a 
party to the conflict faces internal, domestic pressure to maintain a strong 
façade or present a successful image.237  China may fit this paradigm.  It 
faces domestic pressure to sustain its economic progress,238 and would 
therefore likely resist cooperation with any rules of law perceived to be 
destructive of that image.  WTO sanctions could frustrate its citizens’ 
expectations of improved economic conditions,239 which “would be a 
deeply disillusioning experience if China’s government is somehow 
implicated.”240  
Importantly, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides a 
palatable solution by which China’s leaders could avoid a difficult trade-
off between compliance with the WTO’s prescriptions and internal 
political strength.  A canonical principle of the Dispute Settlement Body is 
“to settle disputes, not to pass judgment.”241  Accordingly, after it has been 
decided that a “country has done something wrong, it should swiftly 
                                                                                                                            
234 See WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160 (stating that the dispute settlement 
system is “available” for “trade disputes over intellectual property rights”). 
235 See LEWIS, supra note 3, at 49 (“Even a credible hint that the United States is considering 
[going to the WTO] would have an immediate effect on Chinese decisionmaking.”); see also Robert F. 
Turner, Cyberdeterrenece, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 181, 181 (2013) (“[T]he most effective responses will 
focus on affecting the perceptions of decisionmakers on the other side.”). 
236 See Christina Parajon, War-Stopping Techniques in the Falklands, in STOPPING WARS AND 
MAKING PEACE: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 1, 38, 45–46 (Kristen Eichensehr & W. 
Michael Reisman eds., 2009) (discussing the importance of politically palatable solutions in war-
stopping or mediation efforts in the context of the Falklands dispute). 
237 See id. at 18 (discussing the Argentine junta’s need to appear strong at home).  
238 See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text.  
239 See supra Part II.A.1.  
240 Legro, supra note 29, at 525. 
241 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 158, at 55.  
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correct its fault.”242  Thus, a state deemed to be in violation of the WTO 
rules or spirit of agreement is given the chance to develop a means to bring 
its policies and laws “into line with the ruling or recommendations.”243  
Sanctions—which are punitive in nature and, arguably, viewed by a state 
as more shameful—cannot be applied unless the violator refuses to follow 
the Panel or Appeal Body’s recommendations after a reasonable period of 
time and then fails to agree to compensate the complaining country for that 
failure.244  This system would essentially allow a violator state to take 
ownership of the problem, without admitting direct malfeasance—albeit 
essentially conceding its state responsibility—to remedy the economic 
cyber espionage.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article considered the lack of norms and institutional mechanisms 
that apply to economic cyber espionage in international law.  It argued that 
economic cyber espionage is both a breach of well-established customary 
norms—as those norms have evolved to provide derivative rights to 
economic sovereignty and non-economic intervention—as well as a 
violation of WTO rules.  The Article then explained why the WTO, as the 
anchor of the world economic community, is the most appropriate and 
effective forum for asserting claims regarding this conduct.  It explained 
why the WTO’s treaties and rules should be interpreted through these 
customary norms to establish that economic cyber espionage violates both 
the letter and the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement.  The Article concluded 
with some realist perspective on why this institution would be effective in 
ensuring compliance: it has the power and authority to decide that 
economic cyber espionage violates international law and offers a credible 
process for ensuring that these rules will be enforced.  
                                                                                                                            
242 Id. at 58. 
243 Id.  
244 See id. (“If after 20 days, no satisfactory compensation is agreed, the complaining side may 
ask the Dispute Settlement Body for permission to impose limited trade sanctions . . . against the other 
side. . . . In principle, the sanctions should be imposed in the same sector as the dispute.  If this is not 
practical or if it would not be effective, the sanctions can be imposed in a different sector of the same 
agreement.”). 
